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Abstract
A gravity model is used to evaluate the effects of currency union on intra-regional trade
of ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) member states. The panel data
used includes bilateral observations for fourteen years spanning 1994 through 2006 for 16
countries. Controlling for determinants and deterrents of trade, I find the presence of a currency
union three times as likely to increase intra-regional trade between ECOWAS member countries.
In addition, I find that the effect on trade creation has been steadily falling since 1994.
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1. Introduction
Several studies have suggested that the small size of Western African economies renders
them ineffective in determining the direction of foreign trade. The high level of foreign demand
and supply encountered by small countries leaves them subservient to unfavorable changes in the
international trade market. To gain greater international influence and decrease external
dependence, Western African countries have sought to consolidate their economies. On many
occasions over the years, intensified efforts have been made by Western African leaders to bring
about greater trade between their countries through the formation of a trade union and eventually
a currency union. The creation of ECOWAS (Economic Community of Western African States)
in 1975 was viewed as the first step towards the realization of an economically integrated West
Africa. Greater economic integration occurred between several Western African nations with the
modification of the currency union, WAEMU. (West Africa Economic and Monetary Union)
Several economists examine the effect of a currency union on trade between countries
and have had mixed conclusions. Some authors conclude a significant effect of a common union
on trade while others maintain the effect has been negligible. Another group of authors
concludes that a common currency has no direct effect; instead it has an indirect effect on trade
due to economic integration. Exchange transaction costs and fluctuations, price transparency,
unified trade and monetary institutions between states all accrue to potentially increase trade
flow between members.
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My thesis investigates the effect of a currency union on intra-trade volume in ECOWAS
as well as the possible forms of currency unions, their respective strengths, and weaknesses,
given the political and economical characteristics of Western African countries.
Using a gravity model which measures the level of trade between two countries, this thesis
attempts to pinpoint the effect of a currency union on intra-trade. To examine whether the
presence of a currency union leads to an increase in trade flow, this thesis will account for other
main determinants of trade flow. The currency union, WAEMU serves as a great tool for
measuring the effect of a currency union on trade between ECOWAS member states.
This paper will proceed as follows. Section 2 presents a history of the trade union and
currency union present in West Africa. It also includes a review of existing literature on the
effect of a trade and currency union on trade between member countries. Section 3 covers the
hypothesis of this thesis as well as the model employed in determining trade between countries.
Section 4 and 5 cover the empirical analysis and Section 6 concludes the paper and presents
suggestions.

2. Literature Review
African countries have for a long time sought greater integration between their countries
for economic and political reasons. Masson and Pattillo (2001) explain two principle motivations
underlying the enthusiasm for monetary unions in Africa. First, the perceived success of the Euro
has spurred African countries interest in monetary unions. Second, motivation for a monetary
union has come from the desire to increase economic growth through integration and expand the
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sphere of political influence. African countries could potentially have favorable trade agreements
globally or bilaterally with the EU and the US.
Western African countries have aimed to accomplish regional integration through the
establishment of ECOWAS.

2.1 ECOWAS (Economic Community of Western African States)

ECOWAS was established May 28, 1975 in Nigeria with the starting members of Benin,
Burkina Faso, Cape Verde Islands, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast,
Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo. ECOWAS was
created to promote trade, cooperation, and self-reliance in West Africa. In 1993, members signed
a revised ECOWAS treaty to spur economic integration and political cooperation.1 Studies
analyzing trade integration in Africa place emphasis on the continent’s potential to economically
progress from trade integration.

At its onset, ECOWAS aspired to increase trade interaction between its members through
certain objectives, such as the elimination of custom duties and other charges of equal effect in
respect of the importation and exportation of goods between member states; abolition of
quantitative and administrative restrictions on trade among the member states; establishment of a
common customs tariff and a common commercial policy towards third countries; and abolition
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(as between the member states) of the obstacles inhibiting free movement of persons, goods,
services and capital.2

Despite the target to comparatively increase intra-ECOWAS trade, the volume of trade
flow between ECOWAS member countries and industrial countries has been proportionally
larger than the intraregional trade flows. Annual volume of imports from industrialized countries
to ECOWAS countries between 1981 and 1992 averaged to $13.22 billion. Volume of imports
from African countries during the same period was only $1.59 billion. (Table 1) Exports for a
majority of members declined between 1975 and 2003 (Niger, Senegal, Togo, and Sierra Leone),
others stagnated (Benin) within this same period. A few others had a relatively significant
increase in their export market.3 (Table 2) These figures show a neutral trend in the export
content of Western African countries.

2.1.1 Literature Summary on Effect of Regional Integration in West Africa

Several studies discovered that the effect of integration on regional trade in Western
Africa has been unsatisfactory, as the majority of the objectives of the regional trade integration
in this region have not been realized. Iqbal & Khan (2002) uses two methods of measuring the
impact of ECOWAS on intraregional trade: the trade ratio, a measure of the share of intraregional trade in total trade show and the gravity model, a measure of trade between two
countries. Results from both methods show a lack of significant increase in intraregional trade
between the Western African nations. Likewise, using the trade ratio method, Torre and Kelly
2

E. Olawale Ogunkola. “An empirical evaluation of trade potential in the economic community
of West African States.” Department of Economics and Centre for Econometric and Allied
Research (CEAR) University of Ibadan, Nigeria. (November 1998)
3
Olumuyiwa Alaba. “EU-ECOWAS EPA: Regional Integration, Trade Facilitation and
development in West Africa” (Spring 2006).
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(1992), and Foroutan (1992) discover that such regional efforts have not significantly affected
intraregional trade. They conclude that the share of intraregional trade flows of the member
states of ECOWAS is small (in all cases, below 10 percent) and at best stagnant. More studies
from Ogunkola (1994) and Rose (1997) come to similar conclusion on the non-significant effect
of regional integration on trade between member countries of ECOWAS. Ogunkola (1998)
compares a pre-integration period (1970-1972) to a post-integration period (1978–1980) and
finds that intra-trade between ECOWAS member states remained weak during these periods.

In contrast, using a multivariate trade model Deme (1997) finds that the impact of
ECOWAS on trade flow of its member countries from 1975 to 1991 is positive and that regional
integration has succeeded in increasing trade flow between several members of ECOWAS. Cote
d’Ivoire, Gabon, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Sierra Leone, and Togo appear to be significantly
impacted by ECOWAS. Foroutan and Pritchett (1993) use an augmented gravity model to
compare potential trade in Sub Saharan African countries to current trade. Their study concludes
that regional integration of Sub Saharan African countries positively affects bilateral trade in this
region.

The mixed conclusions are simply an indication that the effect of regional integration on intraECOWAS trade is not as strong as leaders of member states hope for. Ballasa (1965) argues that
developing countries like Western African nations mostly have a subsistent economy, and would
need industries capable of producing competitive manufactured products to achieve trade
creation. Ezenwe (1983) sees the results more as a matter of time and focuses more on the
dynamic effects of trade integration and argues that the trade integration effect in LDC (Low
Developing Countries) such as Western African nations will not be felt over a short period of
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time. Musila’s (2005) finding that the intensity of trade creation varies across period and region
certainly augments Ezenwe (1983) position on the importance of the period.

2.2 WAEMU (West African Economic and Monetary Union)

Despite the rather disappointing intra-ECOWAS trade figures, the desire to accelerate the
pace of regional integration through currency union has not been lacking. ECOWAS was
established as a free trade agreement with the eventual goal of converting it into a customs
union; however, this goal has never been achieved. The ECOWAS Head (Olusegun Obasanjo)
made commitments to work towards a common currency by 2004. To date, there has been no
evidence of a concrete move towards a single ECOWAS currency, save for WAEMU. In the
attempt to bring about greater monetary integration, the nations of the West African Monetary
Union, Benin, Burkina, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo formed the
West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) in January 1994. The creation of a
single currency as well as the adoption of convergence criteria, establishment of a common
external tariff, harmonization of taxes, and establishing structural funds to further a more
balanced development across the union have brought deeper economic integration to WAEMU
member countries.

WAEMU has the CFA Franc as its common currency; the currency was previously
pegged to the French Franc since 1948 and currently to the Euro since 1999. Inflation has been
consistently low, although output has been subject to large swings due a severe recession from
1986-1993. During the 1994-1998 period, output, export, and investment rose faster in WAEMU
member countries than other Western African countries, possibly due to the devaluation of the
CFA Franc. (Masson and Pattillo, 2001)
6

A different trend is demonstrated when WAEMU’s intra-regional exports as a percentage
of total exports is compared to its total exports. Intra-regional trade accounts for less than 10% of
the total trade in WAEMU countries. From Table 7, intra-regional exports have comparably
increased from 9.6% in 1980 to 14.3% in 2001. Moreover, intra-regional exports have been on
an upward trend since 1995, as opposed to the downward trend in ECOWAS intra-regional
exports.

2.3 Literature Summary on Effect of a Currency Union
Theoretically, currency union brings about a number of effects which could be dynamic
and/or static. According to Dramani (2011), reduction of the costs of transaction and the
speculative movements, the reduction of uncertainty, the increase of commercial relationship and
the reduction of the negative externalities between the zone counties are advantages accrued
from the adoption of a common currency. Other benefits include true price comparison between
countries, removal of exchange rate risk and inducement of competition.

2.3.1 Direct Trade Effects
Results from studies on the effects of a single currency appear mixed, as some studies
find significant effect while others report little effect. Using cross-section analysis, Andrew Rose
(1999) found strong evidence of monetary union on trade, with a monetary union increasing
trade trice as much. Rose and Stanley (2005) conducted a meta-analysis of recent studies on the
effect of common currencies on trade and surmised that common currency increases the bilateral
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trade of goods by 30 to 90 percent. Glick and Rose (2000) find lower estimate of about 1.7 using
time series data with country fixed effects. Carrère (2005) uses the Hausman–Taylor (1981)
approach to show that the countries of the WAEMU and the CEMAC trade more within each
union that with other countries.
Such positive findings contrast with the findings of Persson (2001), Rose (2000), and Pakko and
Wall (2001) who all came up with negative or negligible effects of a monetary union on bilateral
trade. Rose (2000) argues that such result was due to the small size of samples and that the effect
is actually large. 4 Perrson (20110 questions Rose’s (2000) method of linear regression by
suggesting a method that uses non-parametric matching estimators, which allow for “systematic
selection into currency unions as well as non-linear effects of trading costs on trade.”5 He obtains
estimate that are not significantly different from zero, indicating that currency unions have little
effect on trade.
Interestingly, Agbodji (2008) discovers that since 1995, WAEMU members’ export to
the rest of the world decreased, while exports amongst themselves increased: an indication of
trade diversion of exports within WAEMU rather than trade creation.
The reason a common currency might have a significant effect on trade is unknown. Rose
(1999) has several potential explanations. He reasons that a common currency means that the
government has a strong commitment to long term integration. This commitment might stimulate
private sector engagement in greater international trade. Also, a common currency could
instigate greater financial integration leading to stronger trade in goods and services.

4

Akoété Ega Agbodji, 2008. “The Impact of Subregional Integration on Bilateral Trade: The
Case of UEMOA.” AERC Research Paper 186 African Economic Research Consortium, Nairobi
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Masson and Pattillo (2001) disagree with the premise that monetary integration can
stimulate other forms of integration. From historical experience, they insist that due to the
disparate nature of Western African countries, a monetary union will not produce other
integration benefits. They conclude that the evidence of a positive impact of monetary
integration on other aspects of integration is at best mixed. However they concede that “The
objective of monetary union however could be a positive force if it initiates a sustained economic
convergence process and involved building the basis for regional cooperation.”6 Irrespective of
Masson and Pattillo’s (2001) conclusion, other studies point out several other effects of the
adoption of a common currency that could augment intra-trade volume.

2.3.2 Reduction of Transaction Cost
By using a single currency, a monetary union may improve economic efficiency by
lowering cost of currency conversion. Currency conversion requires a medium of exchange or
transactions medium subject to a network externality (Dowd and Greenaway, 1993). “Middlemen” agents are removed from the currency exchange transaction. Hence, by eliminating the
need for the exchange of one currency for another, monetary union saves real resources. (Buiter,
1999)
Rose and Van Wincoop (2001) theoretical models suggest a single suggest that a singular
currency has more importance than is allotted to it. National currency seems to be a significant
barrier to international trade in their data. Using a gravity model along with dummy variables
delineating countries with a different currency and multilateral currency unions, they try to
6
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estimate the real benefits of currency unions. They conclude that currency unions lower barriers
associated with national borders, leading to substantial increases in both trade and welfare.

2.3.3 Lowering Speculative Movements & Reduction of Uncertainty
Uncertainty in exchange rate poses as another barrier to trade, as it might reduce potential
investment. Firms are less likely to make investments given that fluctuations in exchange rates
increase their potential risks. Reducing such fluctuations could potentially increase investment
and trade. Several models indicate that reduction in exchange rate volatility increases trade and
vice versa. Clark (1973) examines the export or import decision of risk averse firms and
concludes that an increase in exchange rate uncertainty makes firms reduce trade. Alexander
(2006) makes a more moderate conclusion that the effects of exchange rate uncertainty on trade
are sometimes of uncertain direction and depend on model structures and estimation techniques.
Rose (2000) reviews his assumption in a previous paper (Frankel and Rose, 1998) that a
common currency is equivalent to reducing exchange rate volatility to zero. Equivalence of the
two would indicate that both had the same effect on trade between countries. He argues that the
effects of currency unions and exchange rate volatility are not only precisely estimated, but
economically distinguishable. Hence, currency union has a much higher effect on trade than that
of simply reducing exchange rate volatility. Frankel and Rose (1996) found that countries with
closer trade links tend to have more tightly correlated business cycles.
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2.3.4 Facilitation of Price Comparison
A common currency facilitates price comparison as well. Consumers are thus able to
make a more direct comparison of the value of goods traded. The ability to directly compare
value and price of goods traded brings several markets closer to being a homogenous market
based on one common unit of account. In one homogenous market, consumers benefit from
competitive pricing and are incentivized to import from other nations with more favorable
pricing which spurs trade.
Moreover, such adoption of a single currency increases exposure of a domestic market to
other foreign markets. Such exposure increases competition between the member countries and
changes the competitiveness of national industries requiring adjustments in the structure of the
production and distribution processes (Alexander and Mandler, 2006). Such structural changes
might boost the productivity of domestic industries; incite innovations and create new methods
of cost reduction.
2.3.5 Effect on Tourism
Although not included in trade flow data, tourism usually makes up a significant portion
of foreign trade for several nations. Therefore, an examination of the effect of a single currency
on tourism could produce results significantly related to trade. The obvious effect of the
implementation of a single currency would be greater convenience to tourists, as the hassle and
possible loss from currency conversion is avoided. Only three studies have taken into account the
effect of a common currency on tourism. (Gil-Pareja, 2007; Santana, 2010; Gallego and
Rodriquez, 2010) The first two studies conclude that a single currency has a moderate effect on
tourism. The third study concludes that single currency adoption not only promotes tourism, but
11

also trade. However, they also discover that the estimated effect on tourism is lower for lowincome countries. Consequently, this type of estimated effect would be absent in Sub-Saharan
African countries.

2.4 Implementation of a Currency Union in Western Africa

For ECOWAS to expand into a monetary union, it must have a plan for the execution and
form of such a monetary union. ECOWAS states could all be integrated into a monetary union in
two ways: by expanding the current WAEMU union to include all ECOWAS member countries
or by selectively creating smaller groups of monetary unions. Monetary unification entails giving
up monetary policy as an instrument of stabilization of country-specific economic shocks.
Hence, each country’s loss of independent monetary policies can only be justified by the gains of
a currency union.

2.4.1 Expansion of Current WAEMU Union

To expand the current WAEMU union to include outside ECOWAS member countries,
certain criteria would have to be met by these outside ECOWAS countries. These countries
would have to have maximum budget deficits (excluding grants of 4% of GDP), a rate of
inflation of no more than 5%, gross official reserves covering at least six months of imports of
goods and services, and central bank financing of the budget deficit limited to 10 percent of the
previous year’s tax revenue. Masson (2001) emphasizes that apart from the established criteria,
several lessons from failed monetary unions have to be learnt. First, a true monetary union must
be accompanied by the creation of a single institution with clear assignment of responsibility for
formulation and conduction of monetary policies. Second, the central bank must be free from
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pressures to finance governments, whether directly or indirectly. The monetary union must be
organized around a strong existing central bank or through a peg to a stable international
currency.

Expansion of the current monetary union offers the potential for a significant expansion
of market due to the increase in the number of member countries. The size of the market also
offers member countries the potential for specialization. Moreover, a larger market increases
foreign trade influence on the union. The expansion of WAEMU currency zone to every
ECOWAS member could potentially increase trade between the countries. Ballasa (1965) points
out that for an integration of a given size, the greater the increase in size of the market, the larger
the gain from integration.

In reality, the process of such an expansion faces several obstacles. First, for a monetary
union to succeed, legal, geographical, and cultural barriers to labour mobility should be absent.
The current situation of Western African nations easily depicts them as disparate countries:
different monetary policies, geographical disparities, and high terms of trade differences. For
example, Nigeria is a substantial oil exporter, while most of other countries of the region are net
oil importers. As a result, Nigeria’s terms of trade changes are substantially negatively correlated
with those of Cote’d Ivoire, Niger, Ghana, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, and either weakly
negatively or weakly positively correlated with the rest, except for Guinea. (Masson and Pattillo,
2001) Hence seigniorage revenues play a relatively large role and are likely to continue because
the new common central bank might be unsheltered from political pressure (Beetsma and
Giuliodori, 2010). Simulations by (Masson and Pattillo, 2001) indicate that a full monetary union
among ECOWAS countries would be undesirable for most potential members.
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2.4.2 Separate Monetary Union of Countries
The second method is a more cautious method that could have economic stabilizing
advantages. Selective expansion of smaller countries creates great incentives for existing
members to scrutinize the policies of potential members. Given the widespread lack of both
fiscal discipline and stable macroeconomic policies, the use of monetary union as a tool to
encourage greater discipline and better governance is vital. (Masson and Pattillo, 2001)
As earlier detailed, high costs of transportation in ECOWAS is a huge barrier to trade.
Hence, creation of smaller groups of monetary unions based around geographical proximity,
language, or other similarities might significantly reduce such cost. A monetary union like
WAEMU could be selectively expanded, as neighboring countries achieve greater convergence
with the countries that already share a common monetary policy and currency (Masson and
Pattillo, 2001). Such a strategy ensures that existing monetary unions are not destroyed, rather
improved and built upon.
However, complimentarity of economies might decrease as proximity of Western African
countries increases. Exports of Western African countries are mostly agricultural products. Close
countries tend to have similar climates and hence grow similar crop products. Production of
similar goods might make trade between such nations non-existent.
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2.5 Barriers to Integration

A currency union could potentially suffer from the same barriers that have hampered
trade within ECOWAS intra-trade. The effectiveness of a currency union would be tempered if
current barriers to trade remained present. Alaba (2006) identifies two sets of barriers to regional
trade integration. The first is the barrier associated with tariff policies and the second relates to
barriers created by non-tariff barriers. Tariff levels in Western African countries tend to be high.
Government reliance on tariff revenue and protection of domestic industries are the main reasons
for the high tariffs. The government’s inability to find other sources of income to substitute for
import tariffs has been a significant barrier to trade flows. About a quarter of government
revenue of ECOWAS countries depends on import duties. This problem is made worse by the
fact that many of the Western African countries are operating huge fiscal deficits. For example,
every Western African country except Cote d’Ivoire had fiscal deficits in 2001 (Adenikinju and
Alaba, 2004). Past efforts by ECOWAS to ensure a common external tariff have all failed. On
several occasions, a common external tariff (CET of 0%, 5%, 10%, and 20%) has been set, but
has never been respected by most ECOWAS members, barring WAEMU member countries. A
free trade system could worsen the trade accounts of these countries.

In Western Africa, the lack of infrastructure greatly hampers the progress of trade
integration. Movement of goods and services incurs high costs due to limited means of
transportation. Besides, Ogunkola (1998) explains the relationship between distance and cost of
transportation in Western Africa, using descriptive statistical data. He finds a high correlation
coefficient: an indication of the substitutability between distance and cost. Such substitutability
indicates that the greater the distance between two countries, the higher the cost of
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transportation. In West Africa, mismanagement of roads, poor communication and erratic power
supply have all combined to heavily weigh down the intra-ECOWAS efforts at free trade flows
and ability to respond to trade opportunities and economic integration. Such degenerate level of
infrastructure ensures that Africa cannot gain from economies of scale and reduction of
transaction costs, even in proportion to its economic size. (Masson and Pattillo, 2001)

Besides the similar nature of goods traded between the WAEMU nations, trade is
dominated by a small number of countries selling a small range of products. Products exported
from one WAEMU country to other member countries mainly consist of primary products
especially livestock, maize, cocoa, fresh fish, vegetables and sugar. Manufactured products make
up less than 10% of trade. (Agbodji, 2008) Reliance on agricultural exports presents adverse
implications for the trade and growth of Western African economies. First, it weakens the
installation of reliable commercial policies insofar as this sector is dependent on the climatic
risks and chances of rainfall. (Dramani, Latif and Laye, 2007) Second, Western African
economies suffer from low level of complementarity due to agricultural product as main export
item. Most domestic products cannot be traded, as they tend to be similar across Western African
countries and as such competitive rather than complimentary. Indeed, the similarity of the
structures of production makes that the countries, end up proposing on the markets the same lines
of goods. What causes to weaken the trade between close countries, since the consumers with
range of identical product will choose to get a stock on the local market. Thus, on making the
assumption that the snobbery effect is very marginal. (Dramani, Latif and Laye, 2007)

Moreover, the dependence of WAEMU countries on the rest of the world for
manufactured products (more than 60%) and food and energy supplies stymies the growth of
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new markets within WAEMU and ECOWAS. It is thus, essential to envisage a diversification of
industrial and economic fabric, to allow the emergence of new capable sectors in the long term to
ensure a regular rate of growth of these economies. (Dramani, Latif and Laye, 2007) By
diversifying from only agricultural goods, Western African countries increase the range of goods
that could be potentially traded between them. Moreover, they reduce the risk of adverse shocks
that could hamper economic growth.

These constraints have two implications for the potency of the effect of currency
integration on trade. First, the effect of currency integration could be stymied by the constraints
of political instability, which affect fiscal and monetary decisions made; inability of member
countries to stabilize inflation levels, and inadequate institutions, which make planning and
decision-making cumbersome. Non-trade barriers such as roadblocks and administrative
harassment still hamper intra-zone trade. The union still faces other obstacles: financial market
depth still remains low, and WAEMU countries still face imposing structural problems in the
banking and financial sectors. (Masson and Pattillo, 2001) Alternatively, the creation of a
currency union is the last step towards full trade integration which could lead to better
implementations of standards, regulations and policies; greater business synchronization between
member states.

Hans Linneman (1966) defines the determinants of trade flow as consisting of potential
supply, potential demand and trade impediments. Potential supply constitutes the part of a
country's production not dedicated to domestic needs, but foreign needs. Potential supply varies
with national production and the ratio of exporter's domestic market to foreign market
production. (Deme, 1995) An increase in national production leads to more production than
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domestic demand can consume. Potential supply increases due to this greater increase in national
production. A rise in the ratio of exporter’s domestic market to foreign market decreases
potential supply due to the increase in population size. “The domestic market to foreign market
production ratio is determined by population size. A country with a larger population size will
have a larger domestic market size which allows it to produce a more diversified national output,
and to achieve economies of scale in more lines of production.” (Deme, 1995) Hence, a rise in
population size increases the ratio and decreases potential supply.
The same forces that affect potential supply are expected to determine potential demand.
A rise in national production is expected to increase potential import demand, while a rise in
population size is expected to increase the domestic market to foreign market production ratio
and thus lower the potential demand.
Linnemann(1966), and Aitken and Lowry (1973) point out two groups of factors that
determine trade resistance, natural trade impediments and artificial trade impediments.
Geographic distance, a natural trade impediment, is assumed to play a key role in determining
trade flows between trading partners. A longer distance between trading partners imposes a
higher transportation cost, a longer arrival time of shipments, and a limitation on market
information. Another natural trade impediment is the landlocked status of a nation. Landlocked
countries have a more difficult time trading with other nations. Thus, both variables are expected
to have a negative impact on trade flows. Artificial trade impediments, i.e., impediments created
by government policy, include tariffs; exchange controls, preferential trade arrangements, and
trade embargoes. Linnemann argues that artificial trade impediments that affect the pattern of
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trade flows, such as embargoes and preferential trade arrangements, should be specified in a
trade flow model.7
3. Hypothesis
This study adds the presence of a currency union to the determinants of the size of trade
flow between both nations. The hypothesis is that a currency union will have moderate effect on
bilateral trade flow. The presence of barriers to trade; policy-wise and infrastructural dampens
the trade effect of such a monetary union.
3.1 Gravity Model
The gravity model has been utilized in several variations by a number of authors to
determine the trade flow between two countries. The theoretical foundations of these models
progressively developed thanks to the works of Linneman (1966), Leamer (1970, 1974),
Anderson (1979), Bergstrand (1985 and 1989), Deardorff (1995), Evenett and Keller (1998)8.
The numerous authors who use this model agree that the determining factors of the bilateral trade
are the distance, the levels of income and the size of country (Rose, 2001)

7

Deme, Mamit. 1995. “The Impact Of ECOWAS On Intraregional Trade Flows: An Empirical
Investigation.” Review of Black Political Economy 23 (3) (Winter): 113-29.

8

Dramani, Latif and Laye, Oumy. “Impact on the bilateral trade in uemoa and cemac zone:
Structural VAR approach.” National Agency of Statistics and Demography.(08 March 2007)
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4. Methodology and Data
Based on the determinants of trade flow; we use the gravity model to analyze the data and
explain the effect of the following variables on intra-trade volume. The variable of interest is
WAEMU as the intent of this study is to examine the effect of a monetary union on intra-trade
flow. All other variables are control variables.
logMjkt = a0 + β1logYjt + β2logYkt + β3logPOPjt + β4logPOPkt + β5logDISTjkt + β6ECOWjkt +
β6WAEMUjkt + e
Where j and k denotes countries, t denotes time, and the variables are defined as:
•

Yjt and Ykt are the total income for country j and k respectively. β1>0 and β2 >0 indicate that
the bigger the economy, the more significant trade becomes.

•

POPjt and POPkt are the population of country j and k respectively. The impact of the size of
the population on bilateral trade can be positive or negative depending on the comparative
size of the absorption effect to the economies of scale effect, which is equally related to the
population. A big population can be synonymous with a big domestic market and a
significant endowment in resources so that the high-absorption effect leads to less
dependence on international trade; in this case, a negative coefficient would be expected. In
contrast, a large domestic market enables the gains of economies of scale to be fully realized,
especially in terms of trade opportunities with foreign partners covering a variety of goods;
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this would justify a positive coefficient. The assumption then is that β3 >0 or <0 and β4 >0 or
<0.9
•

DISTjk measures the geographic distance between nations j and k.

•

WAEMU is dummy variable denoting trade occurring between ECOWAS countries due to
their membership in WAEMU Currency Union. It is equal to 1 if both countries are members
of a currency union and 0 if they are not.

•

ECOW is a dummy variable denoting trade between the countries due to their membership in
ECOWAS. It is equal to 1 if both countries are members of a currency union and 0 if they are
not. All countries in this dataset are members of ECOWAS; hence, this variable is omitted
from the equation.

•

e is the error term.

The coefficient of interest is β6, which is the effect of the WAEMU currency union on trade
flows. β6>0 indicates an increase in the propensity to trade given that both nations belong to a
currency union. Hence, greater membership of states in WAEMU should lead to an increase in
intra-trade between ECOWAS member states. 10
Additionally, separate regressions are estimated for the three quarters of the 1994 to 2006 period,
including a pooled regression with year controls.

9

Akoété Ega Agbodji, 2008. “The Impact of Subregional Integration on Bilateral Trade: The
Case of UEMOA.” AERC Research Paper 186 African Economic Research Consortium, Nairobi
10

WAEMU is not solely monetarily integrated, but also integrated by trade, hence several other factors
other than a singular currency might account for the difference in trade between WAEMU nations and
other ECOWAS nations not in WAEMU. This will need to be taken into account in the equation.
21

4.1 Data Description
Data on trade flow is collected from Direction of Trade Statistics.11 The DoT data set
covers bilateral trade between 217 IMF country codes between 1948 and 2010; however, we
restrict our data to the 16 ECOWAS member states.
Population and Real GPD Data were obtained from the World Development Indicators (taken
from the World Bank’s WDI 2006 Online Dataset) data. Augmentations of other variables came
from IMF’s International Financial Statistics.12 Geographical data comes from the database of
Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales (CEPII) website. Other variables
such as latitude and longitude, land area, landlocked and island status, physically contiguous
neighbors, language, colonizers, and dates of independence were gotten from a compiled dataset
on this site.
Using panel data, an econometric analysis is conducted to determine the effect of a
currency union on the intra-trade of ECOWAS member countries. As stated previously, a
dummy variable is used to show presence of membership in ECOWAS. The coefficient of this
variable is a measure of the trade stimulating effect of the integration scheme. Since seven
members of ECOWAS are also members of WAEMU, another dummy variable is specified to
account for trade flows between ECOWAS member countries resulting from membership in
WAEMU. Membership in WAEMU represents the single currency effect on bilateral trade
between states in ECOWAS.
The period for the model is between 2001 to 2010 since tariff dismantling became
complete and effective for all approved products with the coming into force of the common
external tariff (CET), set up to regulate the Union member’s foreign trade.
11
12

International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics.
International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics
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5. Results and Analysis
Table 5 provides the correlation summary for the regression variables while Table 6
provides the correlation summary for the regression variables with the period divided into three
quarters. Table 7 provides the summary statistics and correlation analysis for the 2621
observations included in the data set. The coefficient of interest (β6) for common currency seems
to be significant at 1.12 which when converted gives a coefficient of 3.1(e1.12≈3.1). The β6
estimate of 3.1 implies that a pair of ECOWAS countries joined by a common currency trade
about three times as much with each other.
Table 6 shows the coefficients for common currency progressively decrease with each
consecutive quarter. From 1994 to 1997, the effect of common currency on intra-regional trade
flow is 4.2(after conversion back to natural numbers): an indication that countries sharing the
common currency are four times likely to trade with themselves. The period from 1998 to 2001
period shows a coefficient decrease from 4.2 to 2.9 indicating that these countries will trade only
three times as much with each other. And finally, the period from 2002 to 2006 with a lower β6
estimate of 2.5 compared to previous periods. Overall, the β6 estimate gradually declines from
year 1994 to 2006.
The currency devaluation in 1994 might be responsible for the large effect seen at the onset of
the period, i.e. the first quarter. The devaluation of the CFA Franc made the currency cheaper
and made WAEMU exports favorable to other countries. Thus exports rapidly increased during
this period. We might be viewing the declining effect of currency devaluation as exports begin to
decline from 1998 to 2006.
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A percent GDP increase in both countries seems to positively affect intra-regional trade.
Countries with greater GDP tend to be more willing to engage in trade with other nations. A one
kilometer increase reduces intra-regional trade between two West African countries by a third.
Given the dismal state of transportation infrastructure in Western Africa, an increase in distance
seems to significantly decrease intra-regional trade volume. A state of congruity of countries
increases intra-regional trade by about a half (0.567). Contiguity entails that nations share a
border. Countries with shared borders are more likely to trade between themselves compared to
countries that do not share borders.
An unobserved estimate is the effect of unofficial trade barriers such as numerous
roadblocks and unofficial stringent prerequisites on imports. Since such data cannot be
effectively monitored and recorded, a significant determinant of the level of intra-trade regional
flow goes unrecorded.

6. Conclusion
The current study investigate the effect of a currency union on intra-trade between
ECOWAS member countries, how it could be implemented and barriers that could potentially
reduce this effect. In an effort to expand on previous literature, which presented mixed effects of
currency unions on trade, this research specifically examined the interaction between currency
union and ECOWAS member states.
The results suggest that the presence of the WAEMU monetary union has a significant
positive effect on trade between ECOWAS member states. The effect is significant enough to
triple trade between members of the currency union, a conclusion much similar to that of Rose
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(2000), who found that in “two countries shar[ing] the same currency trade substantially more
than countries with their own currencies … trade is over three times higher between commoncurrency countries.”13
Interestingly, dividing the 1994 to 2006 period into quarters shows a less positive trend.
The effect of the currency union on intra-regional trade decreases over time. The depreciation of
CFA Franc might have been the factor which boosted trade after 1994, but declined over time.
Also, the varying currency union estimates in the different periods indicate that the effect of a
currency union on intra-trade depends on the time period investigated.
Selective expansion of current currency union would be the most cautious and
economically sensible method of expanding the currency union. Given the eclectic monetary and
fiscal policies of Western African countries, stringent rules for fiscal and monetary discipline
would ensure that incoming countries do not disrupt the stability of the currency. This way, the
countries may reduce monetary and fiscal differences while improving infrastructure for a high
level of integrated trade. Ogunkola (1998) believes that a gradual approach to regional
integration that does not directly emphasize an increase in intra-regional trade flow, but concedes
that views such trade as a derivative of economic growth and development of members should be
considered.
A more nuanced impact of barriers such as inadequate infrastructures and other unofficial
trade barriers remains undetermined. Not only might it be reducing trade within the ECOWAS
trade region, it might potentially hamper the effectiveness of a more integrated monetary union

13
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on intra-regional trade. The governments of ECOWAS member states should intensively invest
in improving infrastructure.
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8. Appendix: Tables and Figures

Table 1: 1981-1992 Average Annual Volume and Rate of Growth of Imports by
Each ECOWAS Member Country*
Imports from Partner Countries
Imports from Industrial Countries
ECOWAS Country
1. Benin

Rate of Growth (%)
13

(Million $)
30

Rate of Growth (%)
16

(Million $)
341

2. Burkina Faso

9

118

2

235

3. Cote d'Ivoire

14

323

-1

1,350

4. Gabon

72

30

3

732

5. Gambia

-1

6

7

113

6. Ghana

3

215

6

740

7. Guinea

7

8

16

55

8. Guinea Bissau

12

0.5

5

342

9. Liberia

22

22

24

1,209

I0. Mali

8

129

2

254

11. Mauritania

16

20

-2

298

12. Niger

-3

58

3

232

13. Nigeria

8

82

-3

6,099

14. Senegal

5

138

-2

746

15. Sierra Leone

45

7

1

118

16. Togo

23

55

-1

360

*Computed using data gathered from the Direction of Trade Statistics.

29

Table 2: Exports of goods and services (% of GDP)
Burkina
Cote Niger Senegal
Country Benin
Faso d'Ivoire

Togo

Ghana

Sierra
Leone

Nigeria

1960

6.1

4.9

34.2

7.1

18.9

31.1

28.2

21.3

9.2

1965

7.3

4.7

36.8

9.5

19.7

32.0

17.1

28.9

10.9

1970

15.2

5.5

35.8

10.8

26.4

49.6

21.3

31.0

8.4

1975

14.5

7.3

36.7

19.2

35.4

43.4

19.4

25.1

18.3

1980

15.8

9.0

35.0

24.6

26.9

51.1

8.5

22.9

29.4

1985

23.7

9.6

46.8

20.7

28.6

48.4

10.7

14.8

16.1

1990

14.3

11.3

31.7

15.0

25.4

33.5

16.9

22.4

43.4

1995

20.2

12.4

41.8

17.2

34.5

32.4

24.5

17.4

44.3

2000

15.2

9.1

39.7

17.8

29.9

30.7

49.0

17.3

53.3

2003

14.0

8.5

46.7

16.0

28.4

33.8

40.3

22.4

50.0

Source: World Development Indicator, WDI, 2005.
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Table 3: Comparison of ECOWAS and WAEMU Indicators
1975-79

1980-85

1986-89

1990-93

1994-98

Real GDP Growth

5.9

1.2

2.8

0.4

5.0

Real GDP Per Capita Growth

2.8

-1.9

-0.2

-2.7

1.9

Export Volume Growth

6.7

-2.7

3.9

2.2

7.3

Import Volume Growth

9.6

-4.2

0.5

0.7

6.2

Inflation

14.8

7.4

1.9

0.4

10.6

General Government Fiscal Position2

…

-5.5

-6.1

-6.7

-2.4

Gross National Savings

17.0

10.7

6.7

5.7

12.9

Gross Fixed Capita Formation

18.6

15.9

13.9

13.0

16.4

Real GDP Growth

0.3

0.6

3.3

4.3

3.0

Real GDP Per Capita Growth

-2.4

-2.4

0.5

1.4

0.0

Export Volume Growth

6.7

-2.2

7.5

4.5

6.8

Import Volume Growth

23.5

-0.7

-5.1

8.9

5.2

Inflation

29.2

31.0

28.2

27.2

30.4

General Government Fiscal Position

…

-1.7

-0.7

-0.2

-3.5

Gross National Savings

48.5

11.6

13.3

17.7

16.6

Gross Fixed Capital Formation

20.5

15.6

18.2

19.7

18.4

WAEMU Region1

Non-WAEMU Region3

1

Sources:IMF African Department; IMF World Economic Outlook Database.

1

Includes Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo.

2

Including grants.

3

Includes Cape Verde, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Nigeria, and Sierra

Leone
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Table 4: Summary Statistics of Base regression
Variable

Obs

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

year

2621

2000

4

1994

2006

contig

2621

0

0

0

1

distw

2621

1272

684

188

4246

pop_o

2621

19

55

1

1110

gdp_o

2621

8119

34261

132

906268

gdpcap_o

2621

351

176

63

947

pop_d

2621

17

31

1

145

gdp_d

2621

7587

16255

132

114727

gdpcap_d

2621

368

238

63

3440

rta

2621

1

0

1

1

comcur

2621

0

0

0

1

flow

2621

21

109

0

2538

logYo

2621

8

1

5

14

logYd

2621

8

1

5

12

logpop_o

2621

2

1

0

7

loppop_d

2621

2

1

0

5

logDist

2621

7

1

5

8

logFlow

2118

0

3

-10

8
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Table 5: Effect of variables on ECOWAS Trade Flow
Coefficient
Independent variables

Dependent Variable: logFlow

Common Currency

1.127
(9.63)**

logDist

-1.402
(12.78)**

loppop_d

0.902
(6.76)**

logpop_o

-1.050
(7.71)**

logYd

0.002
(0.02)

logYo

2.120
(19.05)**

Contiguity

0.331
(2.26)*

Constant

-7.665
(6.83)**

Observations

2118

R-squared

0.46

Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
Notes: Distance, Population and GDP are converted to log values. * significant at
5%; ** significant at 1%
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Table 6: Effect of variables on ECOWAS Trade Flow over Three Quarters

Independent variables

comcur

logDist

loppop_d

logpop_o

logYd

logYo

Contiguity

Constant

1994-1997

1998-2001

2002-2006

Coefficient

Coefficient

Coefficient

Dependent Variable:

Dependent Variable:

Dependent Variable:

logFlow

logFlow

logFlow

1.438

1.085

0.937

(6.47)**

(4.69)**

(5.06)**

-1.066

-1.374

-1.675

(5.38)**

(6.31)**

(9.43)**

0.612

0.541

1.346

(2.84)**

(2.02)*

(5.38)**

-0.450

-1.788

-1.560

(2.13)*

(6.49)**

(5.90)**

0.164

0.340

-0.301

(0.90)

(1.51)

(1.57)

1.679

2.899

2.381

(9.29)**

(12.10)**

(11.65)**

0.567

0.217

0.177

(2.09)*

(0.74)

(0.76)

-8.610

-14.252

-5.183

(4.32)**

(5.97)**

(2.73)**

Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
Notes: Distance, Population and GDP are converted to log values. * significant at 5%; **
significant at 1%
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Table 7: Evolution of Intra-Regional Exports as a Percentage of Total Exports

UEMOA

1980

1985

1995

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

9.6

8.7

10.3

11.8

11.0

13.1

13.1

14.3

5.2

9.0

8.6

10.7

10.4

9.5

9.6

ECOWAS 10.1

Sources: World Bank’s World Development Indicators (2004); UEMOA Commission (2000).
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